Citation with stable link: Philip A. Harland, 'Egyptians, Thracians, Judeans, and Carthaginians: Theophrastos on piety and human sacrifice (fourth century BCE on),' Ethnic Relations and Migration in the Ancient World, last modified August 4, 2026, https://philipharland.com/Blog/?p=22958.

Ancient authors: Theophrastos of Eresos on Lesbos, On Etruscans, as cited in a marginal scribal note (scholium) on Pindar’s Pythian Ode 2.2 = William W. Fortenbaugh, Theophrastus of Eresus: Sources for His Life, Writings, Thought, and Influence, 2 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 1991), F586; Theophrastos, On Piety, as cited by Porphyry of Tyre (third century CE, De abstinentia / On Abstinence from Killing Animals 2.5.1-9.2; 2.11.3-15.3; 2.19.4-31.1; 2.31.7-32.3; 2.53.3; 2.59.1-2.61.2 (link; link to Greek) = Fortenbaugh F584.

Comments: In his work On Piety around the turn of the third century BCE, the peripatetic author Theophrastos (or: Theophrastus) of Eresos deployed a significant amount of ethnographic material (only some of which Porphyry preserved in his citations of the work, gathered below). Theophrastos did so in order to back up his particular theory about the origins and development of offerings to the gods. He considered the sacrificing of animals and, therefore, the eating of meat to be signs of a major decline from the superior practice of offering first fruits, namely fruits and plants. Theophrastos’ theory of progressive decline (at least with respect to honouring the gods) has three main steps: (1) The most ancient peoples rightly offered the first portion of fruits and vegetables. (2) Under difficult circumstances, some peoples turned to the offering of human beings and also consumed human flesh. (3) In order to counter the clear problems involved (e.g. gradual annihilation of the population in question), animals were substituted for humans. Stages two and three are both unacceptable to Theophrastos, who insists that the offering of only first fruits (and even then inexpensive and accessible offerings) are compatible with true piety. Asklepiades of Cyprus’ theory has some affinities with this, despite differences (link). In fact, Theophrastos’ close association of human sacrifice with animal sacrifice is aimed, in part, at criminalizing both. In other words, he expects his Greek readers to already condemn human sacrifice, and so connecting that with animal sacrifice may be effective in condemning that too.

In the process of making these arguments, Theophrastos deals with peoples from the “most rational” Egyptians who offered first fruits and who respected animals to populations that ostensibly introduced or continued to practice human sacrifice and/or the eating of human flesh, including Syrians / Judeans (in the past) and Carthaginians (in his present). Theophrastos deploys the language of injustice (adikia) and lawlessness or crime (paranomia) to describe human sacrifice and eating of human flesh (as well as animal sacrifice, in fact), so this has relevance to some potential ancient theoretical bases for criminalizing populations such as the Carthaginians (link to other instances of this process). The passage about the Judeans under the umbrella of “Syrians” engaging in human sacrifice suggests that Theophrastos is associating Judeans with Phoenicians / Canaanites, namely the populations from which Carthaginians descended. Canaanites in the Hebrew Bible were sometimes accused of engaging in the regular sacrifice of human children (link coming soon), and this smear continued into the later period, on which see the Wisdom of Solomon (link).

The Neoplatonic Porphyry of Tyre (third century CE) himself deploys Theophrastos’ arguments in order to support his overall argument (in book 2) against the eating of animal meat in general. The degree to which Porphyry accurately reports Theophrastos’ views and/or adds his own views remains uncertain, and Porphyry himself admits to modifications towards the end of this citation. The discussion of the ancestral customs of many different peoples continues to be important in other parts of Porphyry’s own work, especially in book four (link),

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Theophrastos, On Etruscans

“Sanctuary of Ares, deep in war”: Pindar said this because not only the Carthaginians, Libyans and Tyrrhenians [here likely Etruscans] who sailed against the island of Syracuse had been recently conquered by the armies of Gelon and Hieron [kings of Syracuse], but also Carthage came under their control with the result that it obeyed orders. Anways, Theophrastos in his work On Tyrrhenians says that on Gelon’s order they [Carthaginians] stopped performing human sacrifice (anthrōpothytein).

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Theophrastos, On Piety

[Egyptians’ earliest customs and developments in the offering of first portions]

(2.5.1-2.9.2) (5) As Theophrastos says, it seems like an immense period of time since the most logical descent group (genos) of all, who inhabit the most sacred region made by the Nile [i.e. Egyptians], initiated offering (thyein) the first portions (aparchai; traditionally: first-fruits) to the heavenly gods. These were not myrrh or cassia, nor the first portions of things mingled with the crocus of frankincense. For the practice of offering these began many generations later as a result error gradually increasing, when men, wanting the necessities of life, offered, with great labour and many tears, some drops of these, as the first portions to the gods. Consequently, they did not at first offer these. Instead, they offered grass which, like something with a soft wool-like nature, they plucked with their hands. For the earth produced trees prior to animals, and grass – which germinates yearly – long before trees. Therefore, gathering the blades, roots, and all the seeds of this plant, they burned them as an offering to the visible heavenly gods, to whom they paid immortal honour through fire. For we [i.e. Greeks] also preserve in temples an immortal fire to these heavenly gods, because fire is especially similar to these deities. But from the exhalation or smoke (thymiasis) of things produced in the earth, they called the offerings “thymiatēria” [i.e. a vessel for burning], they called the process of offering “thyein” [i.e. to offer or sacrifice], and they called the offerings [or: sacricifices] “thysiai.” We do not correctly interpret all of this when we consider this to be an error that was later introduced, since we label as “thusia” the apparent ritual service.

But the people in ancient times were so concerned not to transgress custom that they cursed those who departed from the old way and introduced another way, and they called accursed what is burned today. However, just how ancient these previously mentioned burned offerings were may be perceived by someone who considers that many people today also offer certain pieces of sweet-smelling wood. When, after grass, the earth produced trees and when men at first ate acorns from oak trees, they offered to the gods only a few of the acorns on account of their rarity, but they did burn many oak leaves in offerings. After this, however, when humans proceeded to more cultivated food and to offerings of fruits, they said “Enough with the oak.”

(6) But when the fruit of Demeter, namely barley, first appeared after legumes, humanity used it in primitive offerings, moistening it for this purpose with water. Afterwards, when they had crushed and ground it in order to make it eatable, they hid the tools used in this procedure – tools that offered a divine assistance to human life – in a secret place and approached them as sacred objects. But considering the food produced from this when ground to be blessed, when compared with their previous food, they offered the first portions of it to the gods in finely ground form. Therefore, today we use meal that is ground at the end of the offerings, testifying by this how much burned offerings have departed from their ancient simplicity and, at the same time, not perceiving why we perform each of these.

Proceeding, however, from this point, and being more abundantly supplied both with other fruits, we offered to the gods wheat, the first portions of cakes made from the fine flour of wheat, and everything else. We collected many flowers for this purpose and, along with these, everything that was considered beautiful and that had a fragrance suitable to the divine. From these, also, some were used for garlands, and others were burned. But when they had discovered the use of the divine drops of wine, honey, and oil for the purposes of human life, then they offered the first portions of these to the gods.

(7) The amazing procession in honour of the Sun and the Hours, which is still performed at Athens, bears witness to this. In the procession, they carry other plants besides grass, as well as acorns, the fruit of the crab-tree, barley, wheat, a heap of dried figs, cakes made of wheat and barley flour, and, finally, a clay pot.

[Origins of blood sacrifice as lawless or criminal]

However, when this method of men offering the first portions advanced far into criminality (paranomia; or: lawlessness), the use of most horrible sacrificial victims (thymata) – full of complete savagery (ōmotētos) – was introduced. The result was that it seems the curses which were formerly made against us had now come to completion because men were slaughtering animals and defiling altars with blood, beginning in the period when humans tasted blood as a result of experiencing famines and war. For this reason, the lower spirit (daimonion), as Theophrastos says, was indignant at each of these and inflicted an appropriate punishment. As a result, some people became atheists (atheoi), while others may more justly be called evil-minded people (kakophrones) rather than people with evil gods (kakotheoi), because they think that the gods are depraved and in no way naturally more excellent than we are. In this way, some seem to be without offerings, offering nothing of the first portions of what they had to the gods. But others seem to make evil offerings (kakothytoi), also handling sacrificial victims that were illegal (paranomoi).

[Thoans of Thrace as a negative example]

(8) Consequently, the Thoans (Thoes) who inhabit the borders of Thrace were suddenly taken away from the rest of humankind at that time [i.e. during Hesiod’s silver age, if the quotation below is imagined as matching the time-line] because they neither offered any of the first portions, nor made offerings to the gods. The result was that no one could find the inhabitants, the city, or the foundations of the houses: “For did not want to not restrain themselves from arrogance against each other, and they would not serve the immortals or sacrifice on the sacred altars of the blessed ones, as is established.” “They were buried by Zeus son of Kronos, angry because they did not offer honours to the blessed gods” [Hesiod, Works and Days 133-140]. Nor did they offer the first portions to the gods, as it would be just (dikaios) to do.

[Bassarians in Thrace and the eating of human flesh]

But there is the case of the Bassarians [Thracians possessed by Bacchos who were also figures in the lost plays of Lykourgeia by Aischylos], who formerly not only emulated Taurian sacrifices [i.e. human sacrifices], but in a Bacchic frenzy of human sacrifices also ate that flesh in the same way we now eat the flesh of animals. For we [i.e. Greeks] offer to the gods some parts of the animals as the first portions, and we eat the rest. With respect to these people, who has not heard that, insanely rushing on and biting each other and in fact even consuming the blood, they did not stop behaving in this way until the entire descent group (genos) was destroyed among those who engaged in sacrifices like this?

[Athenians and accidental origins of slaying animals]

(9) Therefore, offering of animals is later [i.e. later than human sacrifice] and most recent. It originated from an unpleasant cause – unlike offerings of fruits (karpoi) – such as famine or some other unfortunate circumstance. Among the Athenians, the causes of the peculiar slayings had their origins in either ignorance, anger, or fear. For the slaughter of swine is attributed to an involuntary error of Klymene, who struck and killed the animal by accident. Hence her husband, being terrified as if he had perpetrated a crime (paranomos), consulted the oracle of the Pythian god [i.e. Apollo] about it. But as the god did not condemn what had happened, the slaughter of animals was afterwards considered an indifferent thing. . . [omitted material from Porphyry].

[Further explanations of how animal sacrifice emerged: Necessity]

(2.11.3-2.15.3) These things being the case, Theophrastos reasonably forbids the sacrifice of animals to those people who wish to be truly pious. Theophrastos employs these and other similar arguments, such as the following:

(12) First of all, we offered animals in a situation of great necessity (anagkē), as we say. For famines and wars were the causes that introduced the necessity of eating animals. Since, therefore, we have a supply of fruits, what occasion is there to use the sacrifice caused by necessity?

Secondly, in the case of benefactions, one should reciprocate and offer favours in a different way for different people, according to the value of the benefit granted. So the greatest reciprocations and things of the most honourable nature are given to those who have benefited us in the greatest way, and especially if they are the causes of these gifts. But the most beautiful and honourable of those things, by which the gods benefit us, are the fruits of the earth. For through these the gods preserve us and enable us to live in a way that is in keeping with custom (or: law). The result is that we should honour the gods with these [i.e. the first portion of the fruits]. Besides, it is necessary that when we offer things, we do it in a way that does not harm anyone. For an offering, more than anything else, should be harmless to everything.

[Anticipating objections to the argument]

But if someone says that god gave animals for our use, no less than the fruits of the earth, it still does not follow that animals are, therefore, to be offered, because in so doing animals are injured through having the soul (psychē) taken from them. For an offering (thysia) is, as the name implies, something “holy” (hosia) [i.e. here taken as a synonym for thysia]. But no one is holy if he returns favours using what belongs to someone else, whether he takes fruits or plants from someone who is not willing to have them taken from them. For how can it be holy to do unjust things to those from whom they are taken? If someone who deprives others of fruit does not make an offering in a holy manner, then depriving individuals of things that are more honorable than these and offering them is completely unholy. For in this way what is terrible becomes greater. But the soul (psychē) is much more honorable than things that grow from the ground; to deprive animals of the life in order to offer them is not proper.

(13) But perhaps someone will say that we also take away something from plants when we offer or eat them. But the deprivation is not similar, since we do not take this away from those who do not want them taken away. For, even if we did not gather them, the plants would spontaneously drop their fruits. The gathering of the fruits, also, is not accompanied by the destruction of the plants, as it is when animals lose their soul.

With respect to the honey (literally: fruit), which we receive from bees, since this is obtained by our labour, it is appropriate for us to derive a common benefit from it. For bees collect their honey from plants; but we carefully attend to them. For this reason, it is necessary that such a distinction should be made between our attention and their labour so that they may suffer no harm. But what is useless to them and beneficial to us is the reward which we receive from them.

Therefore, we should abstain from offering animals. For, though all things are in reality the property of the gods, plants still appear to be our property; since we sow and cultivate them, and nourish them by giving attention to them. Consequently, we should make offerings from our own property, and not from the property of other people.

[Offerings should be things that are easily accesssible and inexpensive]

Inexpensive and easily obtainable things are more holy and acceptable to the gods and better adapted to the purposes of offering and to the practice of continual piety. Therefore, anything that is neither holy nor inexpensive should not be offered to the gods, even if it happens to be available. (14) Now the fact that animals are neither easily acquired nor inexpensive may be seen by observing most of humanity (genos): for we are not now to think that some are rich in sheep and others rich in oxen. In the first place, therefore, there are many peoples (ethnē) that do not possess any of those animals which are appropriate for offerings, perhaps with the exception of some dishonorable animals. In the second place, most people who live in cities rarely possess these animals.

But if someone counters that city-dwellers do not have cultivated fruits in abundance, even though this should be admitted, they are not lacking in other vegetable produce from the earth. Nor is it as difficult to acquire fruits as it is to acquire animals. So an abundance of fruits and other vegetables is more easily obtained than an abundance of animals. But something that is easily obtained and inexpensive contributes to piety and to everyone.

(15) Experience also shows that gods enjoy inexpensive rather than expensive offerings. For when that Thessalian offered to the Pythian deity [i.e. Apollo] oxen with golden horns and many other sacrifices (hecatombs), Apollo said that the offering of Hermioneus was more gratifying to him, even though he had only offered as much meal as he could take with his three fingers out of a sack. But when the Thessalian, on hearing this, placed all the rest of his offerings on the altar, the god again said that by so doing his present was doubly more unacceptable to him than his former offering. So an inexpensive offering is pleasing to the gods, and the lower spirit (daimonion) looks more at behaviour (ēthos) of those presenting an offering more than at the quantity of the things which are offered.

(2.19.4-2.31.1)

(19) . . . Consequently, it is necessary that, being purified in our behaviours, we should make offerings which are pleasing to the gods rather than offerings that involve great expense. But if a man’s body is not pure even though it is dressed with pure and bright clothing, he does not think his body is qualified for the holiness (hagnon) of making an offering. But when person goes about making an offering when he has made his body pure and bright, together with his clothing, even though his soul at the same time is not cleansed from evil things (kakoi), he thinks that it does not matter. He behaves as though the god did not especially rejoice in that which is most divine in our nature, when it is in a pure condition, as being allied to his essence. In Epidaurus, therefore, there was the following inscription on the doors of the temple [of Asklepios]: “Someone who enters a fragrant temple should be pure, but purity is understanding what is holy.” (20) The fact that god is not delighted with the quantity of offerings, but with any ordinary offering, is evident from this: before we have tasted the daily food in front of us, we all make an offering of the first portion to the gods. This offering is certainly small, but it is a great honour. Overall, by demonstrating by means of many ancestral customs (patria) of each people, Theophrastos shows that the offerings of those who lived in ancient times consisted of fruits.

[Development of libations as offerings]

He also discusses what pertains to libations in the following manner: “Ancient offerings were for the most part performed without wine. But those offerings without wine are libations of water. Later on, though, libations were made with honey because we first received this liquid fruit prepared for us by the bees. In the third place, libations were made with oil. In the fourth and last place, they were made with wine.”

(21) Now these things are testified not only by the monumental tablets which, so to speak, contain certain true descriptions of the Kretan sacred practices of the Korybantes, but also by Empedokles [of Akragas; fifth century BCE]. In discussing what pertains to offerings and the birth of the gods, Empedokles says: “Neither Ares nor Tumult was for them a god, nor king Zeus, nor Kronos, nor Poseidon, but only queen Aphrodite,” who is friendship, “with painted animals and statues once / of sacred form, with sweet smelling perfumes, / the fume of frankincense and genuine myrrh, / and with libations poured upon the ground / of yellow honey.” This ancient custom is still even now preserved by some persons as a certain remnant of the truth, and “the altars were not soaked with blood of murdered bulls” [fragment of Empedokles’ poem Purifications].

[Consequences of kinship between humans and animals]

(22) For it seems to me that when friendship and a proper sense of kinship was possessed by every person, no one slaughtered any living being because they thought that other animals were related to them. But when Ares and Tumult, all kinds of contention and the principle of war, invaded humankind, then, for the first time, no one in reality spared any one of his kin. The following particulars should also be considered: For, even though we maintain a relationship with men, we think it is necessary to punish and destroy any men who, as it were, by a certain impetus of their own nature and depravity, are incited to harm anyone they may happen to meet. Consequently, regarding irrational animals that are unjust and do evil, and who are impelled to harm those that approach them, it is perhaps appropriate to destroy them. But with respect to other animals who do not at all act unjustly, and are not naturally impelled to injure us, it is certainly unjust to destroy and murder them in the same way that it would not be right to slay men like that. And this seems to show that justice between us and other animals does not arise from some of them being naturally harmful and evil-doing, but others not, as is also the case with respect to humans.

[Neither harmful nor harmless animals should be offered]

(23) Is the consequence of this that we should offer to the gods animals which are thought to be deserving of death? But how can this be possible, if they are naturally depraved? For it is no more proper to offer these than it would be to offer mutilated animals. For in that way we would be offering the first portions of things of an evil nature, but we should not offer these for the sake of honouring the gods. Hence, if animals are to be offered to the gods, we should offer those that are perfectly harmless. Yet it is also acknowledged that animals are not to be destroyed if do not at all injure us. So neither are they to be offered to the gods. If, therefore, neither these, nor those that are harmful, are to be offered, is it not evident that we should abstain from them more than from any thing else, and that we should not offer any one of them, even though it is appropriate that some of them should be destroyed?

[Three ostensible purposes show that sacrifices are not necessary]

(24) In addition, offerings should be made to the gods for three purposes: (A) for the sake of honouring them, (B) in order to show our gratitude, or (C) through a desire for good things.

(A) For, as we offer the first portions to good men, so also we think it is necessary that we should offer them to the gods. But we honour the gods, either exploring the means of averting evils and obtaining good, or when we have previously benefited, or in order that we may obtain some present advantage and assistance, or merely for the purpose of venerating the goodness of their nature. So that if the first portions of animals are to be offered to the gods, some of them for the sake of this are to be offered. For whatever we offer, we offer for the sake of some one of the above mentioned particulars. Is it therefore to be thought that god is honoured by us when we are directly seen to act unjustly through the first portions which we offer to him? Or will he not rather think that he is dishonoured by such a offer, in which, by slaughtering animals that have not at all injured us, we acknowledge that we have acted unjustly. So no other animals are to be offered for the sake of honour.

(B) Nor yet are they to be offered for the purpose of testifying our gratitude to the gods. For he who makes a just retribution for the benefits he has received should not to make it by harming certain other animals. For he will no more appear to make a retribution than he who, plundering his neighbour of his property, should give it to another person for the sake of honour.

(C) Neither are animals to be offered for the sake of obtaining some good thing we want. For a person who tries to seek benefits by acting unjustly is to be suspected as one who would not be grateful even when he has received benefits. So that animals are not to be offered to the gods through the expectation of deriving advantage from the offer. For the person who does this may perhaps trick men, but it is impossible that he can trick the gods. If, therefore, we should make an offering for the sake of a certain thing, but this is not to be done for the sake of any of the before mentioned particulars, it is evident that animals should not to be offered.

[Sacrifices are done for our own pleasure, rather for the gods]

(25) For, by trying to obliterate the truth of these things through the pleasures which we derive from offerings, we deceive ourselves, but cannot deceive the god. Consequently, with those animals which lack honour, lack usefulness, and do not offer us any pleasure, we do not offer any of these animals to the gods. For who ever offered serpents, scorpions, and apes, or any similar animals? However, we do not in fact abstain from any of those animals which are useful to our life or which have something about them that contributes to our enjoyments, since we cut their throats and flay them under the patronage of deity. For we offer to the gods oxen and sheep, and besides these, stags, birds, and fat hogs, even though they do not at all participate in purity, but afford us delight. In fact, some among these animal provide assistance to our life by cooperating in our work, but others supply us with food or provide for our other wants. But those which effect neither of these, yet, through the enjoyment which is derived from them, are slaughtered by men in offerings similarly with those who are useful to us. We do not, however, offer asses or elephants, or any other of those animals that cooperate with us in our work, but are not subservient to our pleasure. Yet, apart from making offerings, we do not abstain from such animals but instead cut their throats for enjoyment. Among those animals which are fit to be offered, we do not offer those that are acceptable to the gods, but those that to a greater degree gratify the desires of men. Testifying against ourselves in this way, we persist in offering to the gods for the sake of our own pleasure and not for the sake of gratifying the gods.

[Syrians and the subset of Judeans who first sacrificed animals and humans out of necessity contrasted to the most rational Egyptians]

(26) And yet among the Syrians, Theophrastos says, the Judeans still even now, as they have from the beginning, offer animals. If someone commanded us to offer in the same way that they do, we should abstain from this action. For they do not eat the flesh of the offered animals. Rather, having thrown the entire sacrificial victims into the fire and pouring plenty of honey and wine on them during the night, they quickly consume the offering in order that the All-seeing Sun may not witness the deed. They do this while fasting during the intermediate days. Throughout this entire time, since they are a descent group (genos) of those who seek after wisdom (philosophoi), they discuss the deity with one another, but at night they theorize about the stars, surveying them and invoking god through prayers. For these Judeans first began making offerings both of other animals and of themselves [i.e. human sacrifice], doing this out of necessity (anagkē) and not of their own will. One may learn about this by looking at the Egyptians, the most rational of all peoples, who are so far from slaying other animals that they make the images of these animals imitations of the gods. In this way they used to think that these animals were related and akin to both gods and humans.

[Recapitulation of the evolutionary scheme]

[Step one of offering fruits followed by step two of eating human flesh and offering human sacrifice, due to lack of food]

(27) For at first, indeed, offerings of fruits were made to the gods. But over time humans became negligent about holiness because fruits were scarce. Through a lack of regular food, they began to eat each other’s flesh (sarkophagein allēlōn). Then, calling on the lower spirit (daimonion) with many prayers, they first began slaying themselves for the gods. Not only did they consecrate to the gods their most beautiful possessions but, going beyond the most beautiful, they offered those from their own descent group (genos).

[Peoples who still maintain customs related to human sacrifice]

From this, even today not only in Arkadia during the Lykaian festival [of Zeus] and in Carthage to Kronos they perform human sacrifices (anthrōpothytousin) on behalf of the community, but they also periodically in remembrance of the custom [i.e. of human sacrifice] sprinkle the altars with blood from members of their own tribe (emphylon). They do this even though the sacred rites exclude – by way of proclamation – anyone from participating who may be responsible for the blood of those who are united with him [i.e. murder of a member of his own tribe]!

[Step three of sacrificing animals and eating their flesh]

Proceeding from this situation, people made the bodies of other animals substitute for their own place in offerings. Once again, through overeating regular food and becoming oblivious to piety, they advanced to insatiability and left nothing untasted and nothing undevoured. This is the same thing that happens today among everyone even with respect to fruits. For when they have alleviated their needs by eating fruits, they then seek to go beyond satiety, working to acquire many things for food which go beyond the limits of moderation. Hence, behaving as though they had not made dishonorable offerings to the gods [i.e. sacrificed animals], they proceeded to also taste the animals which they slaughtered. Emerging from the principle of this action, the eating of animals was added to food derived from fruits. Just as in ancient times they offered the first produce of fruits to the gods and happily, after their pious offer, tasted what they offered, so also they thought that the same thing should to be done when they offered the first-born animals to the gods.

[The original, pious form of fruit offerings as still practiced by Pythagoreans and by Athenians in particular cases]

They did this even though ancient piety did not ordain these particulars in this way, but honoured each of the gods using fruits. For with such offerings of fruits, both nature and every aspect of the soul of humans are delighted: “No altar then was soaked with blood of bulls irrationally slaughtered; but the following was thought to be the worst of every impious deed: to devour limbs as food after taking life” [fragment of Empedokles’ fifth century BCE poem Purifications].

(28) The truth of this may also be perceived from the altar which is even now preserved on the island of Delos. Because no animal is brought to or offered upon that altar, it is called “the altar of the pious.” So that the inhabitants not only abstain from offering animals, but they likewise think that those who established the altar are similarly pious with those who use it. For this reason, the Pythagoreans having adopted this tradition, abstained from animal food through the whole of life. But when they distributed to the gods a certain animal instead of themselves, they merely tasted of it, in actuality living without touching other animals. We, however, do not behave in this way. Rather, being filled with a diet of animal meat, we have arrived at this height of crime (paranomia) in our life by slaughtering animals and using them for food. For neither is it proper that the altars of the gods should be defiled with murder, nor that food of this kind should be touched by humans, and neither is it appropriate that humans should eat one another. Instead, the precept which is still preserved at Athens [in particular cases, mentioned earlier and below], should be obeyed through all of life.

[The cautionary tale of Sopater and the dead ox celebrated at Athens]

(29) For formerly, as we have before observed, when men offered to the gods fruits and not animals, and did not consume the latter for food, it is said that a communal offering was celebrated at Athens. One Diomos or Sopater, who was not a native but farming some land in Attica, seized a sharp axe which was near to him and, because he was excessively angry, struck an ox with the axe. The ox, coming in from his labour, had approached a table with cakes and other offerings on it which were to be burned as an offering to the gods. The ox ate some of these, but trampled on the rest of the offerings. Since the ox was killed, Diomos, whose anger was now appeased, now realized what kind of deed he had perpetrated. Indeed, he buried the ox. Embracing a voluntary banishment, as if he had been accused of impiety, he fled to Krete.

However, since a great drought caused by heat and a dreadful famine was taking place in Attica, the Pythian deity [i.e. Apollo] was consequently consulted by general consent. The god answered that the Kretan exile must expiate the crime and that it would be advantageous to those who had tasted its flesh if the murderer was punished and the statue of the slain ox was erected in the place where it died. For this reason a search was made and when Sopater, who was responsible for the deed, had been found, he thought he would be freed from the hostility that surrounded him, insofar as he was accursed, if everyone engaged communally in the same act. So he said to those who had come after him that it was necessary for an ox to be cut down by the city. However, as they were unsure about who should strike the ox, Sopater said that he would do it if, after making him a citizen, they would share in the murder. When this was granted, they returned to the city and ordered the deed to be accomplished in such a way as it is still performed by them today as follows:

(30) They selected virgins as water-carriers, but these virgins brought water for the purpose of sharpening an axe and a knife. After these were sharpened, one person supplied the axe, another person struck the ox with it, and a third person cut the throat of the ox. But after this, having flayed the animal, all that were present ate its flesh. After these things were performed, they sewed up the hide of the ox, stuffed it with straw, raised it upright in the same form which it had when alive, and yoked it to a plough, as if it was about to work with it. Furthermore, instituting a judicial process concerning the slaughter of the ox, they cited all those who were partakers of the deed in order to defend their conduct.

However, since the water-carriers accused those who sharpened the axe and the knife as being more guilty than the water-carriers were; since those who sharpened these instruments accused the one who provided the axe; since the one who provided the axe accused the one who cut the throat of the ox; and, since this final person accused the knife itself, they condemned the knife as the cause of the slaughter, as the knife could not speak.

From that time until today, during the festival on the Acropolis of Athens which is sacred to Zeus of the City, the sacrifice of an ox is performed in the same way. For, placing cakes on a brazen table, they drive oxen around the table, and the ox that tastes the cakes that are distributed on the table is slaughtered. Likewise, the group (genos) of those who perform this still remains. In fact, all those who derive their origin from Sopater are called “boutypoi” (“ox-strikers”); but those who are descended from him that drove the ox around the table are called “kentriadai” (“goaders”). And those who are descendents of the one who cut the throat of the ox are called “daitroi” (“dividers”) because of the banquet which takes place after the distribution of flesh. But when they have filled the hide, and the judicial process is ended, they throw the knife into the sea.

(31) Hence, people in ancient times also did not consider it to be holy to slay animals that cooperated with us in labour beneficial to our life, and we should avoid doing this even now. . . [omitted sections from Porphyry].

[Restatement of the argument about the superiority of fruit offerings]

(2.31.7-32.3)

(31.7) [missing text] . . . in order that every one, by offering pure and holy offerings to the lower spirit (daimonion), may through holiness obtain the greatest benefits from the gods. (32) But the benefit derived from fruits is the first and the greatest of all others. As soon as they are ripe, they alone should be offered to the gods and to Earth, by whom they are produced. For the Earth is the common hearth of gods and humans. It is necessary that all of us, reclining on her surface, as on the bosom of our mother and nurse, should celebrate her and love her with affection as the source of our existence. For thus, when we come to the end of our life, we might again be considered worthy of viewing the entire race of the gods in heaven. And now seeing them, honouring them with these things, the fruits for which they are jointly responsible with us. Everyone should offer first-fruits from the fruits we have, but not thinking that all of us are worthy to make offerings to the gods. For just as one should not offer everything to them, so perhaps not everyone’s offerings are satisfactory to the gods.

This, then, is the substance of the arguments adduced by Theophrastos to show that animals should not to be offered, with the exception of some interspersed fabulous stories and a few things which we have added to what he has said.

[Porphyry claims Theophrastos supports his views on freedom from emotion and avoidance of the power of evil lower spirits]

(2.43.3-4)

(43) . . . But we, as much as possible, do not want of the things which evil lower spirits (daimones) provide, but we make every effort to become similar to god and to the powers which surround god, both powers pertaining to soul and external powers. This is achieved through freedom from emotion (apatheia), an evolved perception of truly existing beings, and a lively tendency towards them. On the other hand, we strive to become dissimilar to depraved men and evil lower spirits and, in short, to every being that rejoices in a mortal and material nature. The result is that we will also make offerings in conformity with what Theophrastos says. Experts on the gods (theologoi) agree with his statement, knowing well that the degree to which we fail to exempt ourselves from emotions of the soul is the degree to which we connect ourselves with a wicked power, and it will become necessary to appease that wicked power.

[Sacrifice used for divination and a return to the issue of eating human flesh]

(2.53.3) (53) . . . Now even if someone accepts expertise in making offerings for the sake of predicting the future, it still does not necessarily follow that the flesh of animals should be eaten. Similarly, it does it follow that, because it is proper to make offerings to gods or lower spirits (daimones), eating food from animals is then to be introduced. For not only the history which is related by Theophrastos, but also many other accounts, inform us that in ancient times human beings were sacrificed. Yet it must not be inferred that for that reason human flesh is to be eaten.

[Ancient terminology for offerings]

(2.59.1-2.61.2) (59) Also, when the god Apollo orders humans to offer according ancestral customs, he appears to refer everything back to the practice of the ancestors. Yet the ancient custom of offering was with cakes and fruits, as we have already shown. Following from this, offerings were called “thysiai” (offerings), “thyēlai” (acts of offering), “thymelai,” (altars for sacrifice), and the verb “thyein” (to offer, or sacrifice) meant the same thing as “thumian” (to burn incense), which we now call “epithyein” (to offer something in addition). For what we now call “thyein” (to offer), people in ancient times designated “erdein” (to accomplish): e.g. “For Apollo they accomplished hecatombs of bulls or goats.”

[More on expensive offerings]

(60) But those who introduced exorbitant expense into offerings were ignorant that, in connection with this, they also introduced a swarm of evils: fear of lower spirits (deisidaimonia), luxury, and a belief that a deity may be corrupted by gifts or that offerings compensate for injustice. Why do some people offer three animals with golden horns, but other people offer hundreds in sacrifice (hecatombs)? Why did Olympias, the mother of Alexander [of Macedon] offer a thousand of each species of animals, unless exorbitant expense had led to fear of lower spirits? But when a young man was informed that the gods rejoiced in magnificent offerings and, as they say, solemn banquets of oxen and other animals, how was it possible that he could do those things, even though he was willing to act wisely? And when a young man imagined that these offerings were pleasing to the gods, how was it possible he would not imagine he was permitted to act unjustly when he might exonerate himself from mistaken behaviour through offerings? But if he had been persuaded that the gods have no need of these things, and that the gods look at the character of those who approach them and conceive that a right opinion of them and of things in general is the greatest offering, how is it possible that he should not have been moderate, holy, and just?

[Enthusiasm for making offerings]

(61) Actually, to the gods the most excellent first portion offering is a pure mind and a soul that is unaffected by emotion, as well as a moderate first portion offering of our own property and of other things. This is not to be done in a negligent way but with eagerness. For the speed at which we pay honours to the gods should be the same speed at which we give the first seat to worthy men or rise to salute them, and not the same speed as when we pay taxes.

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Source of translation: T. Taylor, Select Works of Porphyry (London: T. Rodd, 1823), public domain, thoroughly adapted by Harland.